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One of the key functions of patents is to put the public on notice as to
what they are allowed to use, sell, or manufacture without a patent-
holder's consent.' Determining patent scope, however, is one of the most
contentious and difficult tasks in modern patent law.2 In fact, many argue
that the patent system is broken because patents are too vague and
indeterminate to function as property rights. Many commentators note that
patents4 lack the clear and stable boundaries provided by property law
fences. In The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law, Professor Adam Mossoff
takes on this idea and shows why property law cannot currently be used as
an analogy for patent law principles.
In his article, Mossoff offers a word of caution to those who would
argue that the boundaries of patent claims are indeterminate when
compared to the "clear" boundaries created by fences in property law. That
word of caution is "the time is not ripe." The time is not ripe because (1)
commentators incorrectly compare the genus of patents to the species of
trespass; and (2) there is no empirical evidence that supports the idea that
property law boundaries are "clear.",6 According to Mossoff, comparing
patents to property has led to the formation of a normative standard that is
flawed and ultimately based on a "trespass fallacy."7
First, the comparison between trespass doctrine and patents fails
because "appropriate conceptual symmetry" is lacking.8 Mossoff
acknowledges that the comparison is appealing "because it reflects
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symmetry between the exclusionary right in a patent and the exclusionary
right in real estate."9 However, this comparison fails because it compares a
genus (the entire legal rights associated with a patent) with a species (the
narrow property doctrine of trespass). 10 Second, the analogy fails because
scholars who use the patent-property analogy presume that estate
boundaries are clear and determinate." However, this assumption may or
may not be true. Because no current formal studies verify that the
boundaries of estates are clear and determinate, commentators who make
the patent-property analogy may be standing on weak footing.
So when will the time be ripe for comparisons between patent
boundaries and property boundaries? Mossoff gives us some hope by
offering a two-step solution to the indeterminacy problem. The first step
requires comparing patents to estates. Comparing the genus of legal rights
associated with patents to the genus of legal rights associated with estates
rectifies the "category mistake." Comparing patents to estates, however,
will require analysis along multiple dimensions, such as space, time, and
use. The second, much larger, step requires an empirical analysis of
property law along these dimensions. Mossoff suggests that the proper
empirical study would capture doctrines such as trespass, adverse
possession, easements, restrictive covenants, and nuisance.1 Additionally,
this empirical study would be based not only on case law, but also on non-
judicial processes such as zoning, environmental regulations, and other
statutes and regulations.13 With these metrics, the study could legitimately
compare property law doctrines with patent law doctrines.
Some commentators suggest that replacing the "rules of exclusion"
with "rules of governance" makes for a better solution to the
indeterminancy critique.14 Accordingly, another solution may be to look
beyond the property-patent comparison and rely on interpreting patents as
a combination of rules and standards. Patents would then be compared not
only to property law doctrines, but also to statutes, contracts, regulations,
and other legal documents. Thus, there would be a shift from focusing on
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the exclusionary rights associated with patents and property to a focus on
permitted and prohibited uses of an asset. 15 Use of a hybrid system based
on both rules and standards would have interesting practical implications.
In practice, parties would still interpret claims, but courts could also rely
more heavily on the doctrine of equivalents and give greater strength to
means-plus function formats under 35 U.S.C. §112(f) 6.16 This hybrid
would balance the public notice function of patents with the equitable
concerns that hinder the inherent clarity of notice found in emerging
technologies that may or may not be present with real property.
In contrast to Mossoff, some commentators argue that the time for
property-patent comparisons will never be ripe, and that the intrinsic
differences between patents and property make the analogy insoluble.
17
For example, Professor Menell argues that philosophical, functional, and
political differences make the property framework unsuitable for
intellectual property. 18 Thus, another possible solution would be tojettison
the property-patent analogy altogether. Commentators such as Professors
Burk and Lemley argue that the meaning of claims may be "inherently
indeterminate,"19 and suggest he solution may be to move from peripheral
claiming to central claiming.20
In sum, Mossoff brings to light an interesting caveat to why we should
be wary of comparing patent law to property law. Mossoff s solution,
however, will require some extremely challenging empirical data
collection. In the end, perhaps, the better solution would be to do away
with the pure comparison between patents and estates and to move to a
hybrid system based on rules and standards, or do away with the
comparison altogether.
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